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ABSTRACT 
The old ways in which surveys of Jews handled marginal cases no longer make sense, 
and the number of cases involved is no longer small. I examine in detail the public-use 
samples of the two recent national surveys of Americans of recent Jewish origin—the 
National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) and the American Jewish Identity Survey 
(AJIS)—and also explore the implications for the American Jewish Committee annual 
surveys of Jewish political opinion. When Jews are defined by the question “What is your 
religion, if any?” the effect is not primarily to eliminate secular or culturally oriented 
Jews. However, large majorities of the children of intermarriage will fail to reply 
“Jewish.” Accordingly, the paper turns to two competing procedures for treating 
respondents of recent Jewish origin who do not report themselves to be Jewish by 
religion. The core Jewish population includes respondents who answer that they have no 
religion. I find this procedure problematic because the meaning of the “no religion” 
response has also changed: it no longer captures people with close connections to the 
Jewish world who deny the religious connection out of principle. Yet two out of three are 
the products of intermarriage. I tentatively suggest an alternative principle: self-identity. 
Americans of recent Jewish origin who are not Jews by religion should be asked (as they 
were in the 2000–01 the NJPS) whether they consider themselves Jewish for any reason. 
Those that reply in the affirmative should be counted as Jews. The paper examines the 
proportions of people affected by limiting surveys of American Jews to Jews by religion, 
and the results of using one or another procedure for deciding who else is a Jew. As an 
example, some demographic outcomes are tabulated using different definitions, as are 
responses to the question “How close do you feel to Israel?” 
 
   2
I began this paper as a way to set the context for a study of the surveys that the American 
Jewish Committee (AJC) conducts annually on American Jewish political opinion. One 
issue raised by those surveys is the quality of the sampling; and part of the question about 
sampling, in turn, concerns the fact that the AJC samples are limited to “Jews by 
religion.” Respondents are asked their religion and those who answer “Jewish” are 
eligible for the sample. As with any sample, there are other concerns to raise about the 
AJC sample design and its formulation of questions for respondents. I will address these, 
as well as substantive findings from those polls in a later paper. Here I am concerned 
with the challenge of defining “who is a Jew?” in recent surveys, and particularly with 
the answer “Jews by religion.” Who is left out of this definition, what difference does it 
make, what are the alternatives? The answers have been radically transformed in recent 
decades by high rates of Jewish intermarriage; the offspring of those intermarriages are 
far less likely than the offspring of two Jewish parents to identify as Jewish by religion. 
In this sense, the issue is far from merely a matter of methodology; it derives from the 
most important transformation in American Jewish social life over the past half century, 
and on a central pattern of American ethnic life. Likewise, all surveys of Jews, national 
and local, will have to confront the definitional challenge; I mention the AJC surveys 
only as an example.  
While the AJC polls are limited to Jews by religion, the major national surveys of 
Jews have cast a wider net. These are the NJPS (National Jewish Population Survey 
1970, 1990, and 2000–01) and the AJIS (American Jewish Identity Survey 2001); they, 
however, probe relatively few political opinions and none about the Arab-Israel conflict. 
And so I was drawn to the AJC surveys, and to the issue of limiting a sample to Jews by 
religion.
1 Since public use samples are now available for both the NJPS and AJIS dataset, 
as well as for the AJC datasets for a half-dozen recent years, it is possible to explore the 
                                                 
 
1 Americans for Peace Now, together with the Arab-American Institute, have produced several recent 
political polls, but relatively little evidence on how those polls are conducted is publicized and there is no 
breakdown by American Jewish subgroups (how Orthodox and Reform Jews might differ, for example).  
Also, the datasets have not been placed in the public domain. The many national polls of American 
opinion, such as the General Social Survey, often ask respondent’s religion, but the number of Jews in a 
typical national survey will be small (roughly 30 in a 1,500-person sample) and the number of questions 
relevant to the Israel and American policy will be few.    3
composition of the samples in detail and with precision. We will not be obliged, in other 
words, to rely on published tables that were constructed to answer other questions.  
*       *      *    
A helpful Brandeis research report from 2002 deals extensively with the substance of the 
AJC reports (Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe 2002). Its authors first caution readers that 
“Jews were defined as people who said their religion was Jewish, so secular Jews, who 
tend to be less attached to Israel, were not included.” The authors no doubt mean to 
define “secular Jews” here in empirical (indeed tautological) terms alone—as Jews who 
did not say “Jewish” when asked their religion. However, the empirical accuracy may 
convey conceptual misunderstandings. And it will be well worth our time to look more 
carefully at these empirically defined “secular Jews” who did not say “their religion was 
Jewish.”
2  
  The answer to this question meant one thing before, let us say, 1950. It has 
come to mean something radically different in the recent period, since roughly 
1990. Yet survey research on American Jews has not caught up with the change. 
That change is a result of intermarriage patterns. To make any sense of the data 
we will have to distinguish conceptually between Americans born to two Jewish-
born parents and other Americans of recent Jewish origin. The distinction is not 
theological of course: in principle, how a person reports attachment to things 
Jewish today has nothing to do with whether one’s parents were both Jewish or 
only one was, or neither were. But the distinction turns out to have enormous 
sociological power in predicting who will chose to report certain kinds of 
attachments. I refer to those with two Jewish-born parents as having “single 
origins” and to the others as having “mixed origins.” Of course, there will also be 
a small number who converted into Judaism, and there are also other anomalous 
                                                 
2 One sometimes hears that we can learn about secular Jews by glancing at the Canadian census. Unlike the 
U.S. census, it asks about both religion and ethnicity, and Jewish is a category of both questions. Those 
who reply that they are Jewish by ethnicity but not religion are thought to be culturally but not religiously 
Jewish. Perhaps so. But quite apart from the differences between the Canadian census questions and the 
relevant NJPS or AJIS questions, the social context of Canadian Jewry (more recent Jewish immigration, 
more segregated education of Jews, etc.) differs from that of United States Jewry. We cannot, I think, 
interpret the outlook of NJPS and AJIS respondents who said they were not Jewish by religion from the 
Canadian census categories.   4
cases such as those who report mixed-origin parent. I will have a word to say 
about these others later.  
Consider first single-origin adults (age 24 and older, with two Jewish 
parents). Nearly all defined themselves as Jews by religion—84% and 88% in the 
AJIS and NJPS, respectively. A notable proportion of these people probably do 
not believe in anything much related to Judaism as a religion, and indeed many 
might qualify as “secular,” given any reasonable definition of the term. In 
particular, a notable minority (13% and 19% among the single-origin adults in the 
AJIS and NJPS, respectively) refused to define themselves in terms of any Jewish 
religious denomination, and have been classified as “just Jews.” Many of these 
apparently chose that term to describe themselves; others simply said they had no 
denomination. For some reason, the former were much more common in the 
NJPS, the latter in the AJIS. In both surveys, however, there is good reason to 
think that many of these people have strong doubts about any theological 
teachings of Judaism. For example, in the NJPS, the great majority of single-
origin Jews by religion said they believed in God: 79% in the sample as a whole, 
including 97%, 87%, and 77% among the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform 
Jews. But among “just Jews,” the proportion is 63%. In the AJIS dataset, the 
comparable figures are not as striking, but they still point in the same direction: 
77% for the sample as a whole, 89%, 86%, 75%, and 69% for the Orthodox, 
Conservative, Reform, and just Jews.  
The AJIS asked Jews whether they think of themselves as secular or 
religious—and defining secular for those who asked as nonreligious. Among all 
single-origin Jews by religion—Jews by religion!—43% replied religious and 
another 9% “somewhat religious,” while no fewer than 28% replied secular and 
another 16% “somewhat secular.” Among just Jews, the latter two proportions 





                                                 
3 Other possible, but uncommon, responses were “a little bit of both” and “unsure.”    5
Table 1.  Single-Origin Jews by Religion: The Subgroup Classified as “Just Jews”:  
                     AJIS and NJPS, 2000-01         
        
        
Detailed codes for answers to the denomination question   
Percentage by 
survey   
found for respondents classified as "just Jew"    AJIS  NJPS   
            
“Just Jew”     15  84  
            
“no denomination,” “none”    52  2  
            
“Nonpracticing”   19  6  
            
“Agnostic,” “atheist”       1  
“secular,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” “humanistic”    10  5  
            
other   5  2  
            
total (all classified as “just Jew”)*    100  100  
        
Notes:         
1) Limited to respondents 24 years of age and older.         
2) Single-origin respondents are those who reported having two Jewish parents.         
3) Among all single origin Jews by religion 24 and older, 13% and 19% of AJIS and NJPS    
respondents, respectively, were classified as "just Jews."          
4) Respondents who reported themselves Jewish by religion but did not affiliate themselves   
with a Jewish denomination (e.g,: Orthodox, Conservative, Reform) have been classified   
as "just Jews." In the NJPS, most such respondents were so classified by the surveyer,   
whereas in the AJIS most were classified by the surveyer as having no denomination.   
However, in both surveys, an appreciable minority of respondents gave other responses,   
which are detailed above.         
 
Moreover, especially in the AJIS, an appreciable minority of the 
respondents classified as “just Jews” actually gave more explicit answers than that 
phrase when asked about their denomination. These are all answers that place the 
respondent outside the religious denomination system—even as they defined 
themselves as “Jewish” by religion. They all are consistent with a skepticism or 
alienation from things religious: nonpracticing, agnostic, atheist, secular (Table 
1). And, in a few cases, they went beyond those negative replies to state explicit 
alternatives to a Jewish religious attachment: they said they were culturally or   6
ethnically Jewish, Zionist, or gave similar responses. We cannot, of course, be 
sure that the majority who merely say “just Jew” or say “none” when asked 
denomination mean to negate religiosity the way the minority who are more 
explicit did. And yet, it does seem probable that the majority must indeed mean 
something close to one or another of the range of specific alternatives mentioned 
by the minority. That is, it seems probable that those who simply said “just Jew” 
or “no denomination” meant to convey that they were defining themselves in 
opposition to any familiar description of their religious practice and probably 
about their religious beliefs. Some probably meant to go farther and indicate that 
they explicitly reject religious beliefs, a handful also indicating alternatives to a 
religious conception of Jewishness. It is not unreasonable to think of all these 
responses as positioning respondents, however vaguely, along a spectrum 
between religiosity and secularism—which any mention of a denomination would 
not do. 
Thus, it is certainly true that there are “secular Jews” out there. But many 
of them respond to the religious question by saying they are Jews, probably 
because they know that the description of a religious affiliation need not have 
anything to do with beliefs and has much to do with origins. Moreover, at least for 
Jews, those origins are not limited to communities of religion. 
Still, there have always been a small number of single-origin Jews who 
would answer “none” to the religion question. Some of these people insist on their 
affiliation to Jewish peoplehood in some way, and some others will insist on their 
non-affiliation with any kind of Jewishness. We can find such people today 
among the respondents of our surveys: 11% and 7%, respectively, of AJIS and 
NJPS single-origin respondents reported that they had no religion (Table 3). 
These people only ended up in the surveys of Jews because subsequent screening 
questions probed further, particularly by asking whether the person had a Jewish 
parent or upbringing. The NJPS went on to ask respondents who had not declared 
themselves Jewish by religion but did report a Jewish parent or upbringing a 
further question: did such respondents consider themselves Jewish in any way.   7
Just over half of these people (56%) answered that they did consider themselves 
Jewish in some way.
4 
Notice now the magnitudes of the single-origin NJPS respondents I have 
been describing. First, we found that 19% who did answer the religion question 
by saying they were Jewish later said they were “just Jews,” and some of these 
elaborated with more explicitly nonreligious answers. By contrast, only 7% of the 
single origin respondents had not said they were Jewish by religion had made it 
into the sample based on the other screening questions. And among these people, 
about half said they considered themselves Jewish in some way; half of 7% is 
under 4%.  
Thus, we have several groups to consider when we ask about “secular 
Jews” of single origin. A large, but unknown, fraction of the 19% who said they 
were “just Jews” and then the 7% who did not report themselves Jewish by 
religion. Of this latter, we should consider both the half who said they considered 
themselves Jewish in some way and the half who said they did not. 
A long research tradition, developed in the pre-1950 world, has tended to 
include respondents who report no religion but come from Jewish backgrounds 
among the Jews. This procedure seemed sensible and, in any case, of trivial 
importance when nearly all respondents were of single-origin. Many of the people 
in question did, in fact, self identify as Jewish culturally. For others, the decision 
not to self-identify as Jewish was often an ideological one of denying roots in an 
ethnoreligious group—as, for example, some Yiddish-speaking communists did. 
Further more, often the younger adults of Jewish origins were the ones most likely 
not to identify with any religion; researchers were probably right to think that 
                                                 
4 To be clear: there were actually four screening questions in the AJIS and NJPS: 1) religion?; 2) if not 
Jewish by religion, did the respondent have a Jewish parent?; 3) if not Jewish by religion or parent, did the 
respondent have a Jewish upbringing?; and 4) if not Jewish by questions 1, 2, or 3, did the respondent have 
any reason to consider themselves Jewish? Those who answered the fourth question with a purely Christian 
reason (“Jesus was a Jew,” etc.) were excluded from the NJPS. The great majority of those who had not 
reported themselves Jewish on the first question but did qualify for the sample on the basis of the later 
questions came from the second question, relating to Jewish parents. Now, once the screening was 
complete, the NJPS (but not the AJIS) also asked certain respondents a relevant follow-up question in the 
course of the main interview. The NJPS asked respondents of no religion whether they had any reason to 
consider themselves Jewish. Fifty-six percent of single-origin respondents reporting no religion consider 
themselves Jewish in some way.   8
many, if not all, of these people were sociologically closest to the Jewish world, 
and that over time many of them would, in fact, reconsider their refusal to identify 
as Jews, for example, when they moved to suburbia and raised children.  
And in the final analysis, the proportions of respondents involved in these 
marginal classifications were small, as they are today for the single-origin 
respondents in the NJPS: only 7% of respondents reported no religion, and 
another 5% reported that they were now affiliated with another religion (for 
nearly all, Christianity). Thus, many “secular” Jews fell in among the 88% of 
NJPS single-origin respondents who had identified as Jewish by religion; among 
the rest were people who in the past had been routinely classified as Jews despite 
claiming no religion (and despite only half claiming to consider themselves 
Jewish in any way). Finally, almost as large a marginal group (5% vs. 7%) 
claimed to have adopted another religion. Members of this last group, although 
included in the NJPS and AJIS samples, have routinely been excluded from the 
actual reports dealing with Jews, and the AJIS and NJPS reports are no exception. 
The discussion thus far describes the offspring of two Jewish-born parents. 
The conventions of Jewish survey research were established during the era when 
these offspring were the overwhelming majority of people who might be 
considered Jewish using any definition, and consequently it didn’t much matter 
how the marginal cases who were not Jewish by religion were being classified. By 
contrast, today a large fraction of American adults with recent Jewish origins are, 
in fact, no longer of single origin. Rather, they are the products of intermarriages 
between a Jewish-born and a non-Jewish-born parent. The proportion of single-
origin Jews in our surveys from 2000–01 reaches only 54% and 62%, 
respectively, of the AJIS and NJPS samples. Indeed, in much of the country, and 
among younger adults in much more of it, those with mixed origins comprise the 
majority among Americans of recent Jewish origin.  
The crucial point for our analysis here is that those with single and mixed 
origin differ radically when they report their current Jewish attachments (Table 2). 
Still others cannot be classified in either group and are shown separately. 
However, these last are socially and culturally much closer to those who had only   9
one Jewish parent and, for conceptual purposes, the crucial distinction is between 
those with two Jewish parents (single origins) and all others.
5    
 
Table 2.  Current Attachments by Origin Type: AJIS and NJPS 2000–01    
                   
Current attachment                                      Percentage of respondents by origins* 
                    AJIS                        NJPS    
     single mixed other all  single mixed  other  all 
Jews by religion    84 18 37  57   88 24  28 65
no religion    11 28 20  18   7 25  14 12
other  religion   0 2 1 1  1 8 9 4
Christian   4 52 42  24  4 42  49 19
total   100 100 100  100  100 100 100 100
                            
percent of adults**     54 28 18  100   62 21  17 100
                   
*Origin types:                   
Single: 2 Jewish-born parents                 
Mixed: 1 Jewish-born parent, 1 parent not born Jewish or partly Jewish           
Other: respondents with part-Jewish parents, Jews by choice, and respondents with incomplete origins data   
**Limited to adults 24 and older                 
 
Some of the mixed-origin respondents, of course, said that they were 
Jewish when asked to report their religion; however, in both the AJIS and the 
NJPS, Jews by religion comprise 26% of the mixed-origin respondents—
compared to 84–88% of the single-origin respondents. Put another way, 74% of 
the mixed origin respondents did not declare themselves Jewish by religion. And 
finally, only 37% of all respondents who report no religion are people of single 
origin. So when we encounter that report, the chances are 2 to 1 that we are 
observing the new pattern in which the offspring of intermarriage is claiming “no 
religion,” and not the older pattern in which there were strong reasons to suspect 
that the person giving the response was decidedly Jewish, and may well have 
considered oneself decidedly Jewish, in various ways. The point, obviously, is not 
that the offspring of the intermarried cannot be “decidedly Jewish in various 
                                                 
5 This third group includes Jews by choice (or had two parents who were in this category), and a 
much larger group for whom relevant data are missing, or who had one or two parents who were 
themselves the children of intermarriage.  
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ways,” but the offspring of the intermarried are surely vastly more likely to have 
grown up in a less-exclusively Jewish milieu, and it is simply a matter of common 
sense to reconsider how we should interpret the larger significance of the answer 
to a survey question (“no religion”) when we know that the social context in 
which it is now given has changed so much from what it was. 
Thus, the AJC surveys, because they are limited to Jews by religion, 
ignore a small percentage of people who had two Jewish-born parents and report 
no religion. These surveys also report a huge percentage of those people who had 
only one Jewish-born parent. And that latter percentage represents a larger 
number of people every year and a larger proportion of all Americans of recent 
Jewish origin every year. However, the question remains how many of these 
people should the surveys in any case ignore because they don’t fit the operating 
definition of “Jews.”   
The significance of this difference in the way people of single and mixed 
Jewish origins define themselves extends far beyond the AJC surveys, of course. 
It is at the center of American Jewish life today, and as such, it challenges and 
complicates every survey of American Jewish life. Moreover, by its nature, this is 
a problem that can have no clean conceptual solution (Perlmann 2006 and 2007); 
we will have to specify whom we mean to include when we speak of “Jews” or 
Jewish opinion. Large and growing differences in whom we mean will hinge on 
the definitions—in contrast to the past when such definitions were maintained for 
the sake of precision, but they could be ignored by readers without much being 
lost. Our best hope, I think, is to try to identify a very few usable alternative 
definitions of who is included and who is excluded in a discussion of “Jewish 
opinion,” and then to familiarize readers with them.  
I feel I should digress here in order to clarify two points. The first point 
concerns the implication of these proportions for questions of Jewish survival 
from generation to generation. I do not intend to get involved in these predictions; 
I simply want to caution readers about using the figures just mentioned—26% vs. 
84–88% declaring themselves Jewish by religion among the mixed-origin vs. 
single-origin adults, respectively.    11
If our interest is in the reproduction of the group across generations, there 
is another, and I think, more meaningful way to look at these figures. When two 
Jews intermarry, they produce one family. When one Jew marries one non-Jew, 
they also produce one family, and the number of children is largely a reflection of 
the number of families created.
6 Consequently, on average 1,000 intermarried 
Jews produce very roughly as many children as 2,000 inmarried Jews. And this 
2:1 ratio, in turn, implies that the proportion of mixed-origin Jews declaring 
themselves Jewish by religion is actually producing a number of Jews by religion 
which is twice as large as the comparable proportion would entail among those 
with single origin. To put it another way, the rate at which the mixed origin 
individuals identify as Jews by religion is best captured by the percentage 
presented—26%. But the actual number of people who are identifying themselves 
as Jews by religion is twice as large among the mixed origin population as it 
would have been had the Jewish parents who outmarried chosen instead to 
inmarry. Thus, a better assessment of the numerical impact of intermarriage in the 
parents’ generation upon the number of adults declaring themselves Jewish by 
religion in the current generation is found by doubling the rate who declare 
themselves Jewish by religion among those with mixed origin—2*26% = 52%—
and comparing this rate to the 84–88% among the single-origin population who 
make the same declaration.  
My second digression concerns the debates between those who respond to 
the high outmarriage rates with “outreach” programs to cultivate Jewish 
awareness among those of mixed origin (or the non-Jewish spouse in a mixed 
marriage), and those who respond by “turning inward” to focus attention and 
resources on the unambiguously attached Jews. I have no interest in joining these 
debates; and I think the figures presented could be used by either group—the 
figure that 26% of the mixed origin report themselves as Jewish by religion and 
that 84–88% of the single-origin proportion do so. Or rather, the point upon which 
                                                 
6 That is, differences in fertility rates between all single and all mixed origin couples are but a 
minor factor in comparison to the difference created by the involvement of only one Jew in an 
intermarried couple rather than two Jews in the inmarried couple. 
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I want to insist is that both sides must use these figures. It is one thing to applaud 
or bemoan the rates; it is quite another matter to ignore or deny them. Two 
surveys of great worth, the AJIS and NJPS, were conducted under different and 
even antagonistic auspices, and they rest on quite different sampling designs. Yet 
they have produced information on the relevant point that is virtually identical 
across the surveys: about three fourths of mixed-origin adults do not, and even 
higher fraction of single-origin adults do, identify as Jewish by religion.
7    
But ultimately whether or not “outreach” and “inward-focused” organizations can 
agree on trends in contemporary data is unimportant to my argument, and so, too, is the 
connection between any data I present and discussions about the American Jewish future. 
Rather, my interest here is on understanding how Americans of recent Jewish origin 
define themselves and how surveys define them. I have already argued that we need to be 
very careful about empirically defining Jews by religion and the rest, since they are not 
Jews by religion, as the “secular.” First, that designation is problematic because, as we 
saw earlier, many who answer that they are Jewish by religion can as reasonably be 
thought of as secular Jews. Second, those who report no religion can no longer be treated 
the way such people were treated half a century ago; today, they are quite simply a 
different social group and there is no reason to treat the meaning of their statement “no 
religion” as though it has the same sociocultural content as it did in 1950. Today, some 
two-thirds of these respondents make their report of no religion from a new cultural 
vantage point, that of having been raised in an intermarried home.  
  Where do these observations leave us? Do we want to limit attention to 
Jews by religion when we define a target group for studying Jewish political 
opinion (or most other questions about contemporary Jewish life)? I think not, but 
at a minimum, such a survey must explain not merely that it is limiting the target 
population in this way, but also something about the numeric and other 
implications of this limitation. On the other hand, how should people who are not 
                                                 
7 Published NJPS reports on American Jewish respondents can be confusing for those trying to 
learn the proportion of adults with mixed origin who identify as Jews. Those reports are limited to 
“Jews” or “Jewish-connected” respondents; others, notably those who declare themselves 
Christians only, have been omitted. See Klaff and Mott (2005); Kadushin, Phillips, and Saxe 
(2005). 
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Jewish by religion, but have been included in surveys of “Jewish opinion” or 
“Jewish life,” be described (not as secular, I have argued)? Moreover, which 
people besides Jews by religion would we wish to include in such a survey? All 
those with recent Jewish origins? Or a more restricted group? And if the latter, 
what are the criteria for inclusion in that more restricted group?    
One method of treating these ambiguities about “Who is a Jew?”—or 
rather “Who is a Jew in an era of widespread intermarriage?”—would be to 
include all individuals that have been selected by virtue of a survey’s screening 
questions. This method is clearly problematic because it leads to the inclusion of 
many people who tell you first that they are Christians and second that they do not 
consider themselves Jewish in any way. It is worth pausing a moment here to 
understand how such people come to be included in the AJIS and NJPS samples 
in the first place. The answer lies with the screening questions asked after a 
person has been asked “What is your religion, if any?” If one responds “Jewish,” 
no further screening questions are asked; but if one gives any other response, the 
next two screening questions ask about a Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing. 
And that is as it should be: the result is a fine dataset for studying Americans of 
recent Jewish origin,
8 and for selecting Jews by any reasonable definition. With 
such a sample, in other words, we can follow the gradations of affiliation and 
nonaffiliation. However, confusion will set in if, without further reflection, we 
treat all members of the AJIS and NJPS samples as Jews. Rather, the survey 
design implicitly assumes that Jews—defined in one way or another by data 
users—form a subset of sample members. The survey design did not provide this 
definition.
9 Including all respondents amounts to using a sample of Americans of 
recent Jewish origin—no matter how completely some of these respondents report 
that they have rejected those origins. For many purposes, surely, this is too 
inclusive a way to define American Jews. For example, if our purpose is to assess 
                                                 
8 I have argued elsewhere that for students of American immigration, ethnicity, and assimilation, the 
sample of all respondents is invaluable (Perlmann 2006 and 2007). 
9 The NJPS sample design did, in fact, assume that respondents would be classified as Jews, persons of 
Jewish background, and non-Jews. However, the classification scheme was judged flawed by the designers 
themselves, and neither it nor its replacement have gained authority over the field. See Klaff and Mott 
(2005) and Kadushin, Phillips, and Saxe (2005).   14
the American Jewish political opinions about Israel and the Arab-Israel conflict, 
do we mean to include a person who had a Jewish parent but was raised as a 
Catholic and has never thought of him-or-herself as Jewish in any way? An 
extreme example? There are roughly 600,000–750,000 American adults of recent 
Jewish origin who define themselves as Christians and also say that they do not 
consider themselves Jewish in any way. 
Two other methods for settling on a workable definition of “who is a 
Jew?” for a purpose such as the one before us suggest themselves. The first has 
been used widely in reports on Jewish surveys; the second has been used widely 
in studies of American ethnicity over the past two decades. I will describe each 
briefly, and argue tentatively that the second method produces more meaningful 
results with contemporary data.  
The first method rests on the concept of  a “core Jewish population.” The 
core Jewish population excludes respondents to NJPS (or AJIS) who report belief 
in a religion other than Judaism. Remaining are Jews by religion and respondents 
who report no religion.
10 Since the great majority of those who report another 
religion report Christianity, the practical effect of this definition is to accept 
everyone of Jewish origin as a Jew unless they are Christians. In the entire NJPS 
sample, 65% and 12% of respondents reported themselves as Jewish by religion 
and having no religion, respectively (Table 2). Thus, the core Jewish population 
from the NJPS includes 77% of all Americans of recent Jewish origins. Thus, in 
the NJPS using the core definition we find that one Jew in six is not Jewish by 
religion (.12/[.12+.65]=.16). However, notice that in the AJIS that figure is much 
higher: one in four (57% and 18% of AJIS respondents reported as Jews by 
religion and having no religion, respectively; and .18/[.18+.57]=.24). In sum: 
using the core definition, one sixth to one quarter of Jews are not Jewish by 
religion in the 2000–01 surveys. 
                                                 
10 Variants include people who report affiliation with both Judaism and another religion, or report 
affiliation with a religion other than Christianity (excepting Unitarianism) and Islam. These variants, 
however, are not known by the name “core Jewish population.” For further discussion of these twists, see 
Perlmann (2006), and Klaff and Mott (2005). In any case, those affiliated with religions other than 
Christianity are a small group; in the NJPS, 19% of respondents reported as Christians and only 4% as 
members of another religion. In the AJIS, the proportions are even more lopsided: Christians 24% and 
members of another religion 1%.   15
In a word, defining Jews as those in the core Jewish population would lead 
us to conclude that the AJC surveys of Jewish political opinion exclude a sixth to 
a quarter of all Jews. We don’t know how the excluded Jews feel about the issues, 
but it is a safe bet that those who say they have no religion will not have the same 
distribution of outlooks as those who say they are Jewish by religion. That it is 
indeed a safe bet can be seen by comparing respondents who report as Jews by 
religion and respondents who report having no religion in the NJPS and the AJIS. 
Both surveys, for example asked about issues such as feeling close to or distant 
from to Israel. Those with no religion are much more distant. And we know from 
the AJC surveys (of Jews by religion) that those who report feeling distant from 
Israel have, on average, different political views from those who feel close.  
However, I suspect that the concept of the core Jewish population has 
outlived its usefulness. It was constructed on the basis of assumptions I already 
discussed: that the “no religion” respondents are secular Jews who identify with 
things Jewish or are at least living in a Jewish world (think: Yiddish-speaking 
communist); and/or they are likely in the future to identify more fully with things 
Jewish (think: when they move to suburbia and raise children). But today only a 
third of the “no religion” respondents reported two Jewish parents and there is no 
reason to believe that their religiocultural outlook and social trajectory are what 
they were half a century ago when a very different group of people were declaring 
that they had no religion.  
Also, in the contemporary scene, the other assumption inherent in the core 
definition seems problematic: the exclusion of people of Jewish origin who report 
another religion, particularly Christianity. Once again, the social and cultural 
meaning of the report has been transformed by intermarriage patterns. The 
meaning many probably associate with the report is simply wrong—namely a 
conversion process. Conversion out has been the icon of Jewish betrayal for 
centuries. But the offspring of intermarriages did not convert, and in many cases 
their Jewish parent probably did not do so either. So when a respondent of recent 
Jewish origin reports being a Catholic, it may well be possible for Jewish 
attachments to remain as well. Recall that these Catholics typically have two   16
Jewish grandparents and perhaps Jewish first cousins as well; no 
excommunication has occurred and probably social and intellectual connections 
to things Jewish have not disappeared. 
The second method for defining Jews is suggested by studies of American 
ethnicity, especially using American census data. Since 1980, the decennial 
census has included the ancestry question: “What is this person’s ancestry?” The 
purpose of the question is to gauge ethnic attachments that still matter beyond the 
second generation. Respondents are expected to mention countries or regions that 
matter to them; in this sense they are self-identifying with, for example, Ireland or 
Italy. Very likely, most Americans do not mention all their ancestries, since 
widespread ethnic intermarriage across the generations ensures that there are often 
many. Individual choice in responses is therefore critical.  
One difference between the census and the surveys of Americans with 
recent Jewish origin is that the latter ask explicitly about one particular origin, 
namely Jewish. However, here, too, there is a parallel in the recent censuses: the 
related Hispanic origin question amounts to an ancestry question that focuses the 
respondent’s attention on one kind of ancestry. Each respondent replies yes or no 
to the question, “Is this person of Hispanic origin?” Responses will depend in part 
on how distant in time and attenuated the Hispanic origins actually are. Most 
Hispanic immigration is of recent years, and it stands to reason that few who have 
an Hispanic immigrant parent fail to declare themselves of Hispanic origin. On 
the other hand, there are also many people who have a Mexican-born ancestor 
much farther back in the family tree and some fraction of these people surely 
respond that they are not of Hispanic origin.
11    
The relevance of the ancestry and Hispanic origin questions to the 
American Jewish surveys is not in the details, for these vary. For example, in the 
latter probing about Jewish origins goes back only one generation—to those who 
                                                 
11 Direction to respondents has varied and has always been imperfect, and the census question has many 
drawbacks (Perlmann and Waters 2002 and 2007; Lieberson and Waters 1988). For Jews, the census 
ancestry question works particularly poorly since naming a religion is not an accepted answer (those that 
nevertheless declare that their ancestry is Jewish are reclassified). Jews are expected to mention “Russian,” 
“Polish,” or other references to political entities. Since the ancestry question is supposed to gauge ethnic 
loyalties past the second generation, the need to provide these answers creates an ironic state of affairs for 
Jews, few of whom (for example) identify with the Tsarist Russia their ancestors left.   17
had a Jewish parent or upbringing. But the larger principle behind those census 
questions remains relevant: to define group membership by respondent self-
identification. In the American Jewish surveys, the crucial additional data come 
from asking respondents who did not declare themselves Jewish by religion but 
did have a Jewish parent or upbringing, “Do you consider yourself Jewish for any 
reason?” The 2000–01 AJIS did not ask this question of all relevant respondents, 
but the NJPS did; future comparable surveys should be sure to include it. 
Table 3.   Respondents by Origins and Current Attachments, AJIS and NJPS, 2000–01 
               
Origins   Current attachment    
% of all 
respondents in    
Respondents other than Jews by 
religion: 
                Consider oneself Jewish for any reason? 
        AJIS  NJPS   
                    NJPS 
only     
                yes  no; other    'yes' as % 
                      of all NJPS 
                      respondents 
                      (col. c* col. a) 
           a     b       c     d     e 
2 Jewish-born parents  Jews by religion    84  88   
            
na 
             
na                    na 
(single origin)  no religion    11  7    56  44  4 
   other religion    0  1    64  36  1 
   Christian    4  4    35  65  1 
total       100 100          6 
                        
not single origin*   Jews by religion    26  26   
            
na 
             
na                    na 
   no religion    25  20    24  76  5 
   other religion    1  9    19  81  2 
   Christian    48  45    20  80  9 
total       100 100          16 
                        
All respondents:   Jews by religion    57  65   
            
na 
             
na                    na 
   no religion    18  12    36  64  4 
   other religion    1  4    25  75  1 
   Christian    24  19    22  78  4 
total        100 100           10 
Note: Two definitions of Jews are discussed in the text. 1) The core Jewish population includes Jews by religion and 
other respondents who reported no religion. These respondents can be identified for each sample in the first two rows 
of each panel. 2) The self-identified Jewish population includes Jews by religion and all other respondents who reported 
that they considered themselves Jewish for any reason. These respondents can be identified only in the NJPS dataset. 
Column “e” shows the percentage of all NJPS respondents that will be added to Jews by religion    
using the second definition.               
*On origin types, see Table 2 and text; “not single” includes “mixed” and “other.”    
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And since only the NJPS includes the relevant follow-up question, we can 
only gauge the numeric impact of using the self-identity criterion from that survey 
(Table 3). We have already seen that of the few respondents of single-origin who 
report themselves to have no religion (7% of the NJPS sample members), about 
half (56%) consider themselves Jewish in some way. Of the 5% who reported 
another religion, two in five (41%) still considered themselves Jewish in some 
way. But the picture is distinctly different among those who did not report single 
origins. Of these respondents, 20% reported no religion, fully 45% said they were 
Christians, and 9% mentioned another religion. And among all these people, 74% 
of NJPS respondents who did not report single origins, only one in five reported 
themselves Jewish. Overall, across the entire NJPS sample, 65% are Jews by 
religion; of the rest, 27% consider themselves Jewish, amounting to 10% of all 
NJPS respondents. Thus, with the self-identification criterion, about one in eight 
were people who did not report themselves as Jewish by religion but did consider 
themselves Jewish in some way (.1/[.1+.65]=.13). This fraction can be compared 
to one in six using the core Jewish population definition discussed earlier.  
Thus, at the moment, the self-identity definition produces a slightly 
smaller number of Jews than the core definition does. We find 77% of all NJPS 
respondents (65%+12%) in the core definition and 75% (65%+10%) in the self-
identity definition (Table 3). Included in both definitions are 65% of NJPS 
respondents who are Jewish by religion and 4% who reported no religion but 
consider themselves Jewish in some way. In addition, the core Jewish population 
includes another 8% of NJPS respondents who reported no religion and do not 
consider themselves Jewish in any way. And finally, the self-identity definition 
includes another 6% of NJPS respondents who reported themselves Christians or 
(rarely) members of another religion, but nevertheless considered themselves 
Jewish in some way. As time goes on, and the fraction with mixed origins 
increases among respondents to such surveys, the two definitions will differ ever 
more, albeit changing at a slow rate.  
Including those who report another religion among the Jews may offend 
many Jews, Jewish researchers among them. Yet, in an era of attenuated, porous,   19
and blurry boundaries, these “Jews of other religion” may be regarded as 
conceptually not unlike “Jews of no religion”; both are among the people who 
consider themselves Jewish “in some way, and both are heavily made up of the 
offspring of intermarriages.”
12 If the researcher is going to disagree with the self-
identification of hundreds of thousands, the disagreement had better be made clear 
to the reader. One way to make that disagreement explicit, for example, might be 
to suggest that these respondents are being pushed too hard when asked “Do you 
consider yourself Jewish?” Perhaps all they mean by an affirmative answer is that 
they have origins in the Jewish people, and, as such, are simply giving a 
tautological reply. Pending more work with such respondents, however, and in the 
context of the ancestry concept which does rest on self-identification alone, it 
would be rash to assume that the tautology exhausts their view of their 
Jewishness.  
  The self-identification criterion may annoy demographers because it may 
appear to include a more obvious element of subjectivity than the other definition. 
The experience with the ancestry question shows that the number of people (in the 
same birth cohort) who self-identify as members of a group fluctuates over time.
13   
Moreover, we will have to consider modifying the self-identity principle in one 
minor way. Some of the respondents who reported that they consider themselves 
Jewish in some way were asked why they consider themselves Jewish. In a few 
cases, the answer has been related only to Christian theology, resting on the 
Jewish origins of Christianity. A common response of this type is “Jesus was a 
Jew.” A purist definition of self-identification would include respondents who 
self-identify for any reason; however, my own view is that these respondents 
should be excluded if the information is available. After all, the purpose of the 
question “Do you consider yourself Jewish for any reason?” is to illicit self-
identifications based on historical continuity with near-term family origins. 
                                                 
12 On attenuated, porous, and blurry boundaries, see Alba (2006), Goldscheider (2004), and Perlmann 
(2006). 
13 Perlmann and Waters (2002 and 2007).   20
However, often the necessary information for exclusion will not be available; so it 
is fortunate that the number in question is likely to be very small.
14 
The knee-jerk response of ethnic and religious organizations is to clutch at 
the broadest definition of the group. Happily, at present, the two definitions 
produce very similar outcomes, and while the first definition culls 2% more of 
NJPS respondents (Table 3), the second definition may produce modestly more 
respondents as time goes on. For almost any question of majority attitudes or 
behavior, the two can hardly produce very different outcomes when they share 
69% of NJPS respondents out of 77% included with the first and 75% with the 
second definition. On the other hand, such subtle differences as we will find are 
likely to show the group added by the second definition are more typical of 
outlooks held by other Jews because it includes only those who self-identify as 
Jews. 
  Because of the connection to intermarriage, there are important demographic 
differences between Jews by religion and other Jews (Table 4). Using the first definition, 
core Jewish population, we find many more of the younger respondents (24–39 years of 
age) among those who did not declare themselves Jewish by religion than among those 
who did: a difference of 16 percentage points in the AJIS (35–19) and of 17 percentage 
points in the NJPS (41–24). Using the second definition (self-identity), the differences are 
more muted. The information is available only in the NJPS, but there we find a 7 instead 
of a 17 percentage point gap (31–24 vs. 41–24). We may be picking up here a stronger 
tendency among the younger respondents to deny all connections with origins. In any 
case, there is no such dramatic difference in NJPS outcomes when we examine where the 
respondents lived. Using either the first or second definitions shows about the same 
degree of difference in regional location between Jews by religion and other Jews 
                                                 
14 Recall the distinction raised in an earlier note between the “consider” question used as the fourth screener 
and the same question used in the body of the interview. My understanding is that routine procedure will 
exclude those who give an answer based on Christian theological thinking alone (“Jesus was a Jew,” etc.) 
in the screener question. In any case, that is what routine procedure should be. If one percent of Christians 
give this response (and there is evidence in the NJPS that they do; Klaff and Mott 2005), such people (if not 
excluded) could amount to one-third of respondents in a national survey of Americans of recent Jewish 
origin. On the other hand, asked in the body of the interview, the question is addressed almost exclusively 
to those with a Jewish parent.   21
selected by these definitions. And the difference is appreciable: the proportion living in 
the five western regions is 13 to 23 percentage points higher than in the eastern regions.  
Table 4.  Differences between Jews Defined by Religion and by Other Criteria: 
 AJIS and NJPS 2000–01 
                   
Demographic or cultural                           Proportion of sample when Jews are defined in various ways    
   characteristics of respondents                             
  
Jews by 
religion            Others in Jewish population                     Total: all Jews 
          
      using two definitions of 
Jews:    
     using two definitions of 
Jews: 
           core Jewish 
 self-
identity     core Jewish  
 self-
identity 
            population     as Jew     population     as Jew 
   AJIS  NJPS     AJIS 
NJPS 
(1)  NJPS (2)     AJIS 
NJPS 
(1)  NJPS (2) 
All respondents                               
   in AJIS  76       24         100      
   in NJPS (1)     84       16         100    
   in NJPS (2)     87           13           100 
                                
Age ranges                         
24-39  19  24     35  41  31     23  27  25 
40-59  44  41     41  36  46     43  40  42 
60 and older  37  35     24  24  23     34  33  34 
total  100  100     100  100  100     100  100  100 
                          
Geographic distribution                          
Middle Atlantic  40  37     18  25  20     35  35  35 
New England, ENC, South  33  37     32  36  38     36  37  36 
Pacific and other   27  26     39  42  29     29  18  18 
total  100  100     89  103  87     100  90  89 
                          
Feeling close to or distant from 
Israel                         
Very  27  33     10  8  20     23  29  31 
somewhat  40  38     24  22  31     36  36  37 
not very\somewhat distant  18  19     26  27  23     20  20  19 
not\distant  15  10     40  43  26     21  15  12 
total  100  100     100  100  100     100  100  100 
 
Now consider the responses to the question about emotional attachment to Israel 
(Table 4). This question is especially interesting because the American Jewish Committee 
also asks it in every one of its surveys; and of the NJPS and AJIS questions it is the one 
that comes closest to being relevant to political opinions about the Middle East. Among 
Jews by religion, the proportions who report feeling distant from Israel is relatively 
low—although it does reach 29% in the NJPS and 33% in the AJIS. However, among   22
others included in the core definition, it reaches no less than 66% in the AJIS and 70% in 
the NJPS. Among those others who self-identify as Jews in some way (that is, using the 
second definition), the figure is 49%, still well above the 29% of NJPS respondents who 
were Jews by religion, but also well below the 70% of NJPS respondents who were not 
Jews by religion but were selected by the core definition. Notice also that the greater 
difference in every case involves those who say they are very distant rather than 
somewhat distant from Israel. But again, the increase is more muted using the second 
rather than the first definition. However, note, too, that the impact of these large changes 
on the total sample outcomes cannot be very great because Jews by religion comprise 
such a large fraction of all Jews. In the total sample, the increase in the proportion who 
feel distant from Israel rises by 8 percentage points in the AJIS, by 6 in the NJPS using 
the first definition, and by only 2 percentage points using the second definition (and, of 
course, when the entire sample is considered, the Jews by religion also dominate the 
demographic outcomes mentioned in the preceding paragraph).  
*                    *                  * 
How then should we summarize the implications of limiting a survey to Jews by 
religion instead of including “all Jews?” I have suggested two ways to define those Jews 
who did not self-identify in the religion question. At present, and for the near-term future, 
limiting a national sample to Jews by religion will not produce dramatically different 
results for the opinions of American Jews taken as a whole. That is because such a high 
proportion of all Jews are Jews by religion. This conclusion has nothing to do with Jews 
in particular; rather it is a matter of simple arithmetic. To appreciate the point we can 
return to the preceding example: feelings of closeness to or distance from Israel. In the 
NJPS, a mere 29% of Jews by religion reported that do not feel close to Israel while 70% 
of other Jews agreed (by the core definition). A vast difference, surely; yet, in the final 
analysis, having the data on all Jews only changes the proportion who feel distant by a 
relatively modest amount, from 29% to 36%. That is because only one Jew in six in the 
NJPS is not a Jew by religion (again using the core definition). And so the result is 
affected by the product of the difference in proportions feeling distant and the proportion 
of relevant sample members: .29*.84+.70*.16=.36.    23
Of course a rise of 7 percentage points on a base of 29% is appreciable in relative 
terms. And this observation points towards the second conclusion. To get beyond broad 
generalizations about all American Jews, we want to hear about subgroups, in this case, 
the subgroup who feels distant from Israel. The AJC not only reports the proportion 
feeling close or distant every year, it also reports all responses for a number of subgroups, 
including subgroups defined by their closeness to Israel. Yet the AJC is omitting 19% 
(.07/.36) of those who feel distant, and so its estimate for the proportion that feel distant 
should be raised, by 24% (.36/.29=.24). Moreover, many results will be affected by the 
distinctive features of the omitted group. Thus, they are much more likely than Jews by 
religion to report feeling very rather than somewhat distant from Israel. Also, the AJC 
routinely tabulates all responses by age. But the omitted group of Jews are notably more 
concentrated among the younger than among all Jews—comprising a quarter, rather than 
an eighth, of them. Thus, the impact of the omissions on results for young adults are 
going to be greater (and the impact on those over 60 smaller) than for the sample as a 
whole. All this, to repeat, is based on the core definition of the Jews; the results would be 
more muted, but in the same direction, using the second definition for Jews, based on 
self-identity. The introduction to the AJC 2006 report is typical of its explanation to 
readers:  
 
“The data reported here are from the 2006 annual survey of American Jewish 
opinion, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, detailing the views of 
American Jews about a broad range of subjects…. 
The sample consists of 958 self-identifying Jewish respondents selected from the 
Synovate consumer mail panel. The respondents are demographically 
representative of the United States adult Jewish population on a variety of 
measures.” (American Jewish Committee 2007). 
  
  I sympathize with the AJC in facing the dilemma of how to present the 
ambiguities of sampling Jews to a readership interested in the highlights of the 
responses. And this sympathy is particularly strong when the magnitudes of 
omitted groups have received so little attention in the past. Also, as I stressed at 
the outset, these are not problems to be laid at the door of the AJC alone. 
Nevertheless, to simply say that the sample rests on “self-identifying Jewish 
respondents” is too vague a summary of the process by which Jews by religion are   24
being used to proxy all American Jews. That summary is tantamount to a 
declaration that one in four to one in eight people reasonably defined as Jews have 
been excluded and that there is every reason to think those omitted differ in 
important ways from those included.  
Future American Jewish surveys will have to struggle with these issues, and better 
definitions for an age of ambiguous identities may emerge. For the present, I have shown 
that respondents not Jewish by religion look more similar on one important measure 
(closeness to Israel) when we use the self-identity rather than the core Jewish population 
definition to select these other Jews. I suspect the same will be true on other measures as 
well. However, to my mind, the fact that the second definition produces respondents 
more similar on average to Jews by religion is not a reason to settle on that definition 
over the core Jewish population one. Rather, I have shown these outcomes partly for the 
sake of completeness and partly because the second definition is less familiar than the 
first, and it also produces slightly fewer Jews. So the fact that it produces more 
comparable responses to those given by Jews by religion may convince some researchers 
to consider it carefully when they might otherwise have been tempted to ignore it. It is 
heartening, in any case, to find that both definitions produce intelligible and similar 
results. My reason for tentatively urging the second definition over the first has to do with 
the changed social meaning of “no religion” in recent decades, and with the value, given 
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